Introduction
The Shapley value [1] is a well-known solution concept in cooperative game theory, which has been investigated by a number of researchers. Most of them treat games with crisp coalitions. However, there are some situations where some agents do not fully participate in a coalition, but to a certain extent. In a class of production games, partial participation in a coalition means offering a part of resources, while full participation means offering all of resources. A coalition including some players who participate partially can be treated as a so-called fuzzy coalition, introduced by Aubin [2, 3] . It shows to what extent a player transfers his/her representability [4] and is also called a rate of participation. Thus it can describe different participation levels of different players in different game situations, varying from noncooperation to full cooperation.
After the pioneering work by Aubin [3] , the Shapley function for games with fuzzy coalition has received more and more attentions. Butnariu [5] gave the expression of the Shapley function on a limited class of fuzzy games with proportional values form. However, most games with proportional values are neither monotone nondecreasing nor continuous with regard to rates of players' participation. In order to overcome this limitation, Tsurumi et al. [6] defined a new Shapley value on a new class of fuzzy games with Choquet integral form. This class of fuzzy games is both monotone nondecreasing and continuous with regard to rates of players' participation. Branzei et al. [7] also introduced a concept of Shapley value for games with fuzzy coalition, which was defined by the associated crisp game corresponding to fuzzy game. Butnariu and Kroupa [8] extend this kind of fuzzy games with proportional values to fuzzy games with weighted function, and the corresponding Shapley function was given. Li and Zhang [9] proposed a simplified expression of the Shapley function for games with fuzzy coalition, which can be regarded as the generalization of Shapley functions defined in some particular games with fuzzy coalition.
On the other hand, by using cooperative game theory, Owen considered linear production programming problems in which multiple decision-makers pool resources to produce some goods [10] . An objective function of the linear production programming problem was represented as total revenue from selling some kinds of goods, and the problem was formulated as a linear programming problem in which, subject to the resource constraints, the revenue is maximized. In many decision-making situations, imprecision and uncertainty are often present due to (a) incomplete information, (b) conflicting evidence, (c) ambiguous information, and (d) subjective information. It can be seen that the possible values of parameters of this kind of production games model are often only imprecisely or ambiguously known to decisionmakers. With this observation in mind, it would be certainly 2 Journal of Applied Mathematics more appropriate to interpret the decision-makers' understanding of the parameters as fuzzy numerical data which can be represented by means of fuzzy sets of the real line known as fuzzy numbers. It reflects the decision-makers' ambiguous or fuzzy understanding of the nature of the parameters in the problem-formulation process [11] . The resulting production games problem involving fuzzy parameters would be viewed as a more realistic version than the conventional one [12, 13] .
From fuzzy mathematical programming perspective, Nishizaki and Sakawa [11] investigated cooperative game problems with fuzzy characteristic functions. Mares [14, 15] and Mares and Vlach [16] were also concerned with the uncertainty in the value of the characteristic function associated with a game, where the characteristic function was expressed by fuzzy number. At the same time, they discussed the fuzzy Shapley values of this kind of fuzzy game. Borkotokey [17] considered a cooperative game with fuzzy coalitions and fuzzy characteristic function simultaneously. A Shapley function in the fuzzy sense was proposed as a solution concept to this class of fuzzy games. Yu and Zhang [18] studied a class of particular games with fuzzy coalitions and a fuzzy characteristic function with Choquet integral form and gave the explicit form of the Shapley value for this class of fuzzy games. However, as Li and Zhang [9] pointed out, there were other many approaches to extend cooperative games to fuzzy games besides Choquet integral method [6] and proportional values method [5] . Which one is more natural? The specific game situation is needed to be considered, because each fuzzy game may only be suitable for a certain case. Therefore, as a kind of special fuzzy game with Choquet integral form, the fuzzy Shapley function of the fuzzy game was only suitable for a certain case. In order to improve this limit, in this paper, we pay more attentions to generalized fuzzy game with fuzzy coalitions and fuzzy characteristic function, and a generalized expression of the fuzzy Shapley function is proposed for the generalized fuzzy game.
In order to do this, this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review some concepts of interval numbers and fuzzy numbers and introduce the Hukuhara difference on interval numbers and fuzzy numbers. In Section 3, a game with fuzzy characteristic functions is introduced, and its fuzzy Hukuhara-Shapley function is proposed, and some of its properties are investigated. Furthermore, an applicable example is given. In Section 4, we investigate a new class of games with fuzzy coalitions and fuzzy characteristic function and give a simplified expression of the generalized fuzzy Shapley function for the new fuzzy games. It is shown that it can be regarded as a generalization of the fuzzy Shapley function defined in the proposed fuzzy games with some particular games with fuzzy coalition and fuzzy characteristic function. Finally, in Section 5, we summarize the main conclusions of the paper.
Preliminaries
In this section, we start by providing a summary of some concepts of interval numbers and fuzzy numbers, which will be used throughout the paper.
Interval Numbers.
Let R be (−∞, ∞), that is, the set of all real numbers. Given − , + ∈ R and − ≤ + , the closed interval
Obviously, when − = + , the interval number reduces to a real number − or + . We say that a real number is a member of an interval number , written as ∈ , if − ≤ ≤ + . Let us denote by IR the class of all closed and bounded intervals in R. Throughout this paper, when we say that is a closed interval, we implicitly mean that is also bounded in R.
In the following, we will briefly review the order relation and basic operation of interval numbers [19] .
Definition 1. For any interval number and ,
Consider the following:
Definition 2. For any interval numbers
+ ] ∈ IR, the arithmetic operations on interval numbers are defined as follows: 
It is easy to prove the following conclusions. is the membership function of a fuzzy set over [23, 24] To quantify fuzzy concepts, we use the following fuzzy numbers [25] . (ii)̃( ) is nondecreasing on (−∞, 0 ] and nonincreasing on [ 0 , +∞);
(iv) Supp(̃) is compact, where Supp(̃) = { ∈ R | ( ) > 0}.
An important type of fuzzy numbers in common use is the trapezoidal fuzzy number [21] whose membership function has the form
where , , , ∈ R with ≤ ≤ ≤ and the trapezoidal fuzzy number̃is simply denoted by ( , , , ). It is called nonnegative if ≥ 0. The trapezoidal fuzzy number degenerates to be a triangular fuzzy number when = , while it becomes an interval number (i.e., a rectangular fuzzy) when = and = . Any crisp real number can be regarded as a special trapezoidal fuzzy number with = = = = . In this paper, the set of all fuzzy numbers on R is denoted by FR.
Let any fuzzy number̃∈ FR have membership functioñ , and the level set (or -cut) is defined as̃= { ∈ R | ≥ }, ∈ [0, 1]. It follows from the properties of the membership function of a fuzzy number̃that each of itscuts̃is an interval number, denoted bỹ=
Definition 6 (see [25] ). Let̃be a fuzzy number;̃=
(ii)̃≤̃iff̃≤̃;
(iii)̃=̃iff̃=̃;
Let̃,̃∈ FR, and let * be a binary operation on R. -cuts of the fuzzy number̃ * ̃can be calculated because of the following:
Employing the -cut representation, arithmetic operations on fuzzy numbers are defined in terms of the wellestablished arithmetic operations on interval numbers [25] . (̃ * ̃) .
However, similar to the interval number operations, in the fuzzy contexts, equatioñ=̃+̃is not equivalent tõ =̃−̃=̃+(−1)̃or̃=̃−̃=̃+(−)̃. This has motivated the introduction of the following Hukuhara difference [22] . Regarding the existence of the Hukuhara difference, there is an extensive literature described in the study by Dubois et al. in [21] .
Proposition 9. Let̃,̃∈ FR. The Hukuhara differencẽ− Hẽ xists if and only if
Definition 10. Let be a nonempty set; ( ) denotes its power set. For mapping
→ ( ) .
If, for any 1 , 2 ∈ [0, 1], we have
then is called a nested set of .
Proposition 11. Giveñ,̃∈ FR, for any
Proof. For all ∈ [0, 1], we have
If ≤ , according to Definition 7, we have
Thus for any ∈ [0, 1], ( ) is a nested set. This completes the proof of Proposition 11. For = 1, 2, . . . ,̃∈ FR, we define
According to representation theorem [25] and Proposition 4, it is easy to obtain the following conclusions.
Proposition 12. (i) Let
(ii) Given fuzzy number̃≥ 0, for ∈ R, then
Fuzzy Hukuhara-Shapley Function for Games with Fuzzy Characteristic Function

Crisp Cooperative Games and Shapley Value.
A finite transferable utility cooperative game (from now on, simply a game or cooperative game) is a pair ( , V), where = {1, 2, . . . , } is a finite set of players and V : ( ) → R + is called characteristic function satisfying V(⌀) = 0. ( ) is the family of crisp subsets of ; that is, ( ) is equivalent to 2 | | . We will refer to a subset of as a coalition or crisp coalition and to V( ) as the worth of , which can be seen as the amount of utility the coalition obtains when the players in work together. The class of all crisp games with player set is denoted by ( ). | | denotes the cardinality of . Given a game ( , V) and a coalition , we write ( , V) for the subgame obtained by restricting V to subsets of only (i.e., to 2 | | ). If there is no fear of confusion, a (cooperative) game
The set of all superadditive games is denoted by 0 ( ). For the sake of simplicity, the bracket is often omitted when a set is written in this paper. For example, we write instead of { , , }.
As an important solution concept for crisp cooperative games, the Shapley value is defined as follows.
Definition 13. The Shapley value (V) of player with respect to a game V ∈ 0 ( ) is a weighted average value of the marginal contribution V( ∪ ) − V( ) of player alone in all combinations, which is defined by
Equation (17) is a unique expression which satisfies three axiomatic characterizations of Shapley value (see the study by Shapley [1] ). Proposition 14 (see [1] ). For any , ⊆ and ̸ = ⌀, if the -unanimity game is denoted by
then, { } ∈2 \⌀ is a basis in the linear space 0 ( ) of all games, and, for V, it can be uniquely written as
where
where , denote the cardinality of crisp coalitions and , respectively.
Cooperative Games with Fuzzy Characteristic Function.
In a crisp cooperative game, characteristic function describes a cooperative game and associates a crisp coalition with the worth V( ), which is interpreted as the payoff that the coalition can acquire only through the action of . The cooperative crisp game is based on the assumption that all players and coalitions know the payoff value V before the cooperation begins. The traditional cooperative game assumes that all data of a game are known exactly by players. However, in real game situations often the players are not able to evaluate exactly some data of the game due to a lack of information or/and imprecision of the available information on the environment or on the behavior of the other players. Taking imprecision of information in decision-making problems into account, this assumption is not realistic because there are many uncertain factors during negotiation and coalition formation. In many situations, the players can have only vague ideas about the real payoff value. Therefore, it is more suitable to incorporate fuzzy characteristic function, represented by fuzzy numbers, into cooperative games. In this section, the fuzzy Hukuhara-Shapley function for games with a fuzzy characteristic function is proposed.
Definition 15.
A cooperative game with fuzzy characteristic function form is an ordered pair ( ,Ṽ) whereṼ :
Fuzzy characteristic functionṼ( ) can be interpreted as the maximal fuzzy worth or cost savings that the members of can obtain when they cooperate. Often we identify the game ( ,Ṽ) with its fuzzy characteristic functionṼ. The class of games with fuzzy characteristic function is denoted by ( ). In this paper, we mainly discuss the superadditive games with fuzzy characteristic function; that is, for any two crisp coalitions , ∈ ( ) such that ∩ = ⌀, for any ∈ (0, 1],Ṽ ( ∪ ) ≥Ṽ ( ) +Ṽ ( ). Then, for any crisp coalitions , ∈ ( ), ⊆ and any , ∈ (0, 1] such that > , the superadditive game ( ,Ṽ) also satisfies
According to Proposition 9 it is easy to see that the Hukuhara differenceṼ( ) − HṼ ( ) exists for the superadditive games with fuzzy characteristic function. The set of all superadditive games with fuzzy characteristic functionis denoted by 0 ( ).
Obviously, players outside any carrier have no influence on the play since they contribute nothing to any coalition. Such a player that does not contribute anything to any coalition is called a null player; that is, for any ⊆ \ , V( ∪ ) =Ṽ( ).
Let ( ,Ṽ), ( ,̃) ∈ 0 ( ); for ∀ ⊆ defineṼ+̃: (Ṽ+ )( ) =Ṽ( )+̃( ). It is easily seen that ( ,Ṽ+̃) ∈ 0 ( ).
Definition 17. Let = {1, 2, . . . , }; for anyṼ ∈ 0 ( ), a functioñ:
0 ( ) → (FR + ) , wherẽ= (̃1, . . . ,̃), is said to be a fuzzy Hukuhara-Shapley function on 0 ( ) if it satisfies the following three axioms.
Axiom A 1 . IfṼ ∈ 0 ( ) and ⊆ is any carrier ofṼ, then
Axiom A 2 . IfṼ ∈ 0 ( ) and is a permutation of the player set, that is, :
→ , then, for any ∈ ,
It is easy to obtain the following conclusion. 
Proof. It is obvious that is a carrier of̃. For ∈ \ , since and ∪ are also carriers of̃, according to Axiom A 1 , we have
For , ∈ and ̸ = , let be a permutation of such that ( ) = , ( ) = , ( ) = , = \ { , }. First, we prove that, for any ⊆ ,̃( Journal of Applied Mathematics
According to Axiom A 2 , we havẽ
According to the above analysis and Axiom A 1 , we obtain that
That is,̃(̃)
This completes the proof of Lemma 19.
Lemma 20. IfṼ ∈ ( ), for any , ⌀ ̸ = ⊆ , thenṼ is a linear combination of :
where is a carrier ofṼ. The coefficients̃are independent of and are given bỹ
where , denote the cardinality of coalitions and , respectively.
In general, according to the definition of carrier, we havẽ
This completes the proof of Lemma 20.
Remark 21. ForṼ ∈ 0 ( ) and any ∈ (0, 1], it is obvious that crisp games V − , V + ∈ 0 ( ). Assume
According to Proposition 14, it is seen that V − and V + can be uniquely written as
Obviously,
According to representation theorem of fuzzy set [25] , it is easy to obtain the same conclusion as Lemma 20. This completes the proof of Proposition 22.
From Proposition 18, if̃(Ṽ)
Proof. According to Lemmas 19 and 20 and Axiom A 3 , we havẽ
This completes the proof of Lemma 23. 
Proof. According to Lemmas 23 and 19, we havẽ
Since
(−1) 
From Lemma 20, it is known that̃(Ṽ) is well defined by andṼ. Thus according to Lemma 23,̃(Ṽ) is well defined byṼ, , and ; that is,̃(Ṽ) is well defined byṼ and .
In the following, we prove that the function defined by (44) satisfies Axioms A 1 -A 3 in Definition 17.
According to Lemmas 19 and 20 , it is easy to verify that (Ṽ) satisfies Axioms A 1 and A 2 .
Let V, ∈ 0 ( ) and V + ∈ 0 ( ); theñ
These complete the proof of Proposition 14. 
For the interval Hukuhara-Shapley function (Ṽ ), ∈ (0, 1], and it has the following properties.
Proposition 26. (i) For any pair
Proof. (i) According to (49), it is easy to prove the conclusion.
(ii) Let = !( − −1)!/ !; from (49), for any * ∈ (0, 1], we have
These complete the proof of Proposition 26.
Call players and symmetric in the game ( ,Ṽ) ifṼ( ∪ ) =Ṽ( ∪ ) for every coalition ⊆ \ { , }. Call a player in a game ( ,Ṽ) a dummy (player) ifṼ( ∪ ) − HṼ ( ) =Ṽ( ) for all ⊆ \ { }.
According to Theorem 24, it is easy to obtain the following conclusion.
Corollary 27. GivenṼ ∈ 0 ( ), if and are symmetric in game ( ,Ṽ), theñ(Ṽ) =̃(Ṽ). If is a dummy in game ( ,Ṽ), theñ(Ṽ) =Ṽ( ). If is a null player in game ( ,Ṽ), theñ(Ṽ) = 0.
Symmetric players have the same contribution to any coalition, and therefore it seems reasonable that they should obtain the same payoff according to the value. A dummy player only contributes his/her own worth to every coalition, and that is what he/she should be paid. A null player does not contribute anything to any coalition; in particular alsõ V( ) = 0. So it seems reasonable that such a player obtains zero according to the value.
Proof. Let be a carrier of V. If ∈ and ∉ , thenṼ( ∪ ) = V( ). FromṼ( ∪ ) ≥Ṽ( ) +Ṽ( ), we haveṼ( ) = 0. From Corollary 27, we havẽ(Ṽ) = 0, sõ(Ṽ) =Ṽ( ). If ∈ and ∈ , sinceṼ( ∪ ) ≥Ṽ( ) +Ṽ( ), we havẽ
Hence, according to (44), we easily havẽ(Ṽ) ≥Ṽ( ).
The proof is completed.
According to Theorem 24, it is easy to obtain the following conclusions, too.
Corollary 29. Define a functioñ:
Then the functioñis the unique fuzzy Shapley function on 0 ( ).
Corollary 30. For any twoṼ,̃∈
According to the above analysis, we can use another equivalent axiomatic system to define the fuzzy HukuharaShapley function on 0 ( ).
value. Theñsatisfies the following three axioms, if and only if̃(Ṽ) is the fuzzy Hukuhara-Shapley functioñ(Ṽ).
Axiom (56)
Proof. Obviously,̃(Ṽ) satisfies the three axioms. Conversely, supposẽ(Ṽ) satisfies the three axioms.
(i) Let̃∈ 0 ( ) that is identically zero. In this fuzzy game, all players are symmetric, so Axiom F 2 and Axiom F 1 together implỹ(̃) = 0.
(ii) Let be a null player inṼ ∈ 0 ( ). Then the condition in Axiom F 3 applies tõandṼ with all inequalities being equalities. So Axiom F 3 yields (Ṽ) ≥̃(̃) and̃(̃) ≥̃(Ṽ). Hence, by (i),̃(Ṽ) = 0.
(iii) Let ⊆ \ ⌀ and̃∈ FR. According to Lemma 20,  we havẽ
Hence,̃(̃) =̃| | −1 , where = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ) satisfying = 1 when ∈ and = 0 when ∈ \ .
(iv) According to Lemma 23 we havẽ
(58)
The proof of̃(Ṽ) =̃(Ṽ) is completed by induction on the number (Ṽ) of terms inṼ = ∑ ∈ ( )\⌀̃w ith̸̃ = 0.
0 ( ) with (̃) < , where ≥ 2. LetṼ ∈ 0 ( ) with (Ṽ) = . Then there exist coalitions 1 , 2 , . . . , and fuzzy numbers̃1,̃2, . . . ,ũ nequal to zero, such thatṼ = ∑ =1̃. Let = ⋂ =1 . For ∈ \ , definẽ= ∑ : ∈̃̃. Because (̃) < , the induction hypothesis implies
Further, for every ∈ ( ),
So, by Axiom F 2 , it follows that̃(Ṽ) =̃(̃) =̃(̃) = (Ṽ). So, for all ∈ \ , we havẽ Further, according to Axiom F 1 , combining with (61), we have
Let , ∈ ; then, for every ⊆ \ , ,
so and are symmetric. Hence, by Axiom F 2 , we havẽ
Generalized Fuzzy Shapley Function for Generalized Fuzzy Games
Cooperative Games with Fuzzy Coalition.
For a finite set of players = {1, 2, . . . , }, we call = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ), ∈ [0, 1], the fuzzy coalition variable and call # = { | = or = 0 for each ∈ } the set of fuzzy coalition variables created by . The level variable set of is denoted by = { 1 , 2 , . . . , }. For any ⊆ , we denote = { | ∈ }. = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ) is called a fuzzy coalition; here, is a constant which denotes the participation level of player . Similar to # , we denote by # the class of fuzzy coalitions created by , which is defined by # = { | = or = 0 for each ∈ }. The set of fuzzy coalitions is denoted by ( ); the empty coalition in a fuzzy setting is denoted by ⌀ = (0, 0, . . . , 0). = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ) satisfying = 1 when ∈ and = 0 when ∈ \ , with ∈ ( ), denotes a crisp coalition. It corresponds to the situation where the players within fully cooperate; that is, they have participation level 1, and the players outside are not involved in at all; that is, they have participation level 0.
= (1, 1, . . . , 1) is called the grand coalition. We write instead of { } . Let ⊆ ; the fuzzy coalition variable corresponding to is denoted by = ∑ ∈ . When = , the fuzzy coalition corresponding to is denoted by = ∑ ∈ . Cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions are represented by a pair ( , V), where function V : ( ) → R + such that V(⌀) = 0. If there is no fear of confusion, it is denoted by V as well. The class of cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions and player set is denoted by ( ).
In what follows, ∨ and ∧ are those elements of ( ) with the th coordinate equal to max( , ) and min( , ), respectively. The set operations ∨ and ∧ play the same role for the fuzzy coalitions as the union and intersection for crisp coalitions. For any , ∈ ( ), ∧ = ⌀, if V( ∨ ) ≥ V( )+V( ), then V is called superadditive game. 
Definition 34. Given V ∈ 0 ( ), ∈ ( ); based on , a fuzzy coalition ∈ # is called a carrier of in V if, for any
The set of carriers of in V is denoted by (V, ).
Let be a permutation of . For any ∈ ( ) and any V ∈ 0 ( ), the permutation of fuzzy coalition is defined by = ⋅ −1 and V( ) = V( −1 ). Then, V : → V( ) from ( ) to R + is still a fuzzy game in 0 ( ).
A crisp coalition ∈ 2 corresponds in a canonical way with fuzzy coalition , where ∈ [0, 1] is the vector = { (1), (2), . . . , ( )}, where the th coordinate ( ) = 1 if and only if ∈ ; otherwise, ( ) = 0. From the viewpoint of geometry meaning, the set 2 of all admissible coalitions in is the set of all vertexes of [0, 1] . Therefore, the set 2 of all admissible coalitions can be equivalently denoted by {0, 1} : ∈ 2 → ∈ {0, 1} ; that is, the correspondence between 2 and {0, 1} is one to one. Through this identification of coalitions with their characteristic vectors, a cooperative game is a function V : {0, 1} → R + with V( ) = 0, where = (0, 0, . . . , 0) corresponding to the empty coalition.
There exist different methods to extend -person cooperative games to -person cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions, such as proportional values method [5] and Choquet integral method [6, 26] . However, Li and Zhang [9] pointed out that which one is more natural may be insignificant if the specific game situation is not considered. Each fuzzy game may only be suitable for a certain case. When a fuzzy game established in one case is applied to another situation, the invalidity of it may be inevitable. Inspired by their work, in the following, we propose a generalized fuzzy game, game with fuzzy coalitions and fuzzy characteristic function, and a simplified expression of the fuzzy Shapley function is given for this generalized fuzzy game. It is also proved that the simplified expression is regarded as the generalization of fuzzy Shapley function defined in some particular fuzzy games, such as fuzzy games with proportional value and Choquet integral form.
Generalized Fuzzy Shapley Function for Generalized Fuzzy
Games. In this section, we incorporate fuzzy coalition and fuzzy characteristic function into the game, which is called a generalized fuzzy game or fuzzy game.
A generalized fuzzy game is represented by a pair ( ,̃), where the fuzzy characteristic functioñ:
Obviously, a fuzzy game degenerates to be a game with fuzzy coalitions when the range of the mapping̃is R + and to be a game with a fuzzy characteristic function when the definitional domain of the mapping̃is ( ). It degenerates to be a crisp game when the definitional domain and range of the mapping̃are ( ) and R + , respectively. Thus, our discussion and game models can be applicable to games involving both crisp and fuzzy games. The set of games with fuzzy coalition and fuzzy characteristic function is denoted by ( ).
( ) → (FR + ) is called generalized fuzzy Shapley function based on if it satisfies the following three axioms.
Axiom S 2 . If̃∈ ( ) and is a permutation of , then, for any ∈ ,̃(̃)
=̃(̃) .
(68) , = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ) ∈ ( ). Theñ
is a generalized fuzzy Shapley function of player with participation level based on .
Proof. It is similar to the proof of fuzzy Hukuhara-Shapley function in Theorem 24; therefore, here it is omitted.
By means of Choquet integral, Yu and Zhang [18] proposed a class of fuzzy games with indeterminate integral form and the fuzzy Shapley function was developed.
Definition 37. Given ∈ ( ), let ( ) = { | > 0, ∈ } and let ( ) be the cardinality of ( ); that is, ( ) = | ( )|. The elements of ( ) are written in the increasing order as ℎ 1 < ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ < ℎ ( ) . Then a gamẽ∈ ( ) is said to be a fuzzy game with "indeterminate integral form" if and only if the following holds:
for any ∈ ( ), where ℎ 0 = 0. The set of games with indeterminate integral form in ( ) is denoted by ( ). For̃∈ ( ), Yu and Zhang [18] obtained the following conclusion.
Theorem 38. The functioñ:
is a fuzzy Shapley function on ( ), wherẽis the function given by (44).
Besides Choquet integral method, we can apply the proportional values method proposed by Butnariu [5] 
The set of the fuzzy games with proportional values in ( ) will be denoted by ( ). For the sake of simplicity, a fuzzy game with proportional values form is called a fuzzy game if there is no fear of confusion. There is a one-to-one correspondence between a game with a fuzzy characteristic function and a fuzzy game. We call the game with a fuzzy characteristic function corresponding to a fuzzy game the associated game with a fuzzy characteristic function, and we call the fuzzy game corresponding to a game with a fuzzy characteristic function the associated fuzzy game.
Theorem 40. A functioñ:
is a fuzzy Shapley function of player with participation level on ( ), wherẽis the function given by (44).
Proof. We only need to prove that the function defined by (74) satisfies Axioms S 1 -S 3 in Definition 35. Similar to the proof of Theorem 24, it is easy to obtain the result. Therefore, here it is omitted.
In the following, we make a comparison among the above fuzzy Shapley functions.
For any ⊆ , we denote by ( ) the set of -players with the players of \ being null players of V. Then, for any ⊆ ( ) andṼ ∈ ( ), we haveṼ( ) =Ṽ( ∩ ).
Lemma 41. LetṼ ∈ ( );̃(Ṽ) is a fuzzy HukuharaShapley function in Theorem 24. Then, for any
Proof. According to the definition of̃(Ṽ), the proof of Lemma 41 is similar to that of Lemma 1 in Li and Zhang [9] and therefore here it is omitted.
Proof. Let ( ) = { | > 0, ∈ }, = | ( )|. The elements of ( ) are written in the increasing order as ℎ 1 < ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ < ℎ . Suppose = ℎ ; theñ (̃) ( ) = 
According to Lemma 41, the remaining part of the proof of Theorem 42 is similar to that of Theorem 4.3 in Li and Zhang [9] ; therefore, here it is omitted. 
Conclusion
Shapley value is a well-known solution concept in cooperative game theory. In crisp game, it has been applied widely in many cases. In fuzzy game, Shapley functions of game with fuzzy coalition or with fuzzy characteristic function, as an important solution concept, have been paid more attention. Games, subject to fuzzy coalitions as well as those pertaining to fuzzy characteristic function, are separately investigated in the literature. In this paper, based on the Hukuhara difference, a fuzzy Hukuhara-Shapley function on the class of games with fuzzy characteristic function is investigated.
And some interesting properties are shown. Further, a new fuzzy game model that admits both fuzzy coalitions and fuzzy characteristic functions is proposed. A simplified expression of the generalized fuzzy Shapley function for the generalized fuzzy games is given. It is shown that the simplified expression of the generalized fuzzy Shapley function is equivalent to that of fuzzy games with indeterminate integral form in the study by Yu and Zhang [18] . When the domain of the characteristic function or coalition is restricted, the generalized fuzzy Shapley function can be applicable to crisp games, games with fuzzy coalitions, and games with fuzzy characteristic functions. Thus, the simplified expression of the generalized fuzzy Shapley function for this kind of fuzzy games can be widely applied in many cases to address more realistic situations.
